Using data from the Finnish private sector, this paper shows that giving birth to a child has negative effects on the mother's wage. Analysis of the reasons for the wage penalty associated with motherhood suggests that the loss of human capital during the child-related career break is an important factor behind the motherhood wage penalty. The paper also finds some evidence that mothers' selection into different types of firms than childless women may contribute to the wage penalty. Instead differences in unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics between mothers and childless women seem to be unimportant in explaining the motherhood wage penalty.
Introduction
The gender wage gap has narrowed in nearly all labor markets during recent decades as a result of women's increased investments in education, on-the-job training and other forms of human capital.
However, at the same time the wage differences between mothers and childless women, the so-called motherhood wage penalty, have remained constant or even increased in many countries (e.g. Waldfogel 1998; Joshi et al. 1999) . As a result the importance of family status as a component of the gender wage gap has increased. Nevertheless, the motherhood wage penalty and the factors behind it have received much less attention than the gender wage gap literature in general.
This paper is about the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish labor market. Using data from Statistics Finland covering the period 1993-2002 I try to answer several important questions about the effects of children on women's wages. First, how large is the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish private sector? Second, how does the penalty vary with the length of the career break? Third, how permanent is the penalty? Last but not least, do firm characteristics play a role in affecting the size of the motherhood wage penalty after human capital related and other individual background factors have been controlled for?
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature of the motherhood wage penalty. First of all, the empirical strategy applied in the paper differs somewhat from that typically used in the motherhood wage penalty literature. Most of the existing studies have investigated the wage effects of children by simply including a child-dummy or a variable indicating the number of children in the pooled (i.e. mothers and childless women pooled together) wage model. This approach has the obvious drawback that it does not provide any information for example on relative wage changes due to childbirth or how the motherhood wage penalty evolves with time. The empirical approach taken in this study sheds light on these aspects.
Secondly, due to the lack of appropriate data, most earlier studies on the motherhood wage penalty have focused on the role of worker characteristics in determining the size of the penalty leaving firm and job characteristics for much less attention. However, mothers may systematically search for firms or jobs that allow them to more easily combine work with family obligations and trade off these features for wages. If this is the case, then it is important to also take employer characteristics into account in the wage regressions. My data set contains a rich set of firm characteristics that the earlier literature (e.g. Brown and Medoff 1989; Winter-Ebmer 1994; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller 1999 ) has found to be important determinant of wages (e.g. size, productivity, female share of the workforce etc.) allowing me to explore the question of the importance of employer characteristics in explaining the motherhood wage penalty.
Thirdly, there is no earlier research on this topic from the Finnish labor market. Also the number of papers from the other Nordic countries is fairly small while most of the studies on the motherhood wage penalty have focused on the US and the UK. Although the purpose of this paper is not to replicate earlier studies in different institutional setting but to investigate the motherhood wage penalty using new data and new kind of approach, Finland is nevertheless an interesting country to study the wage effects of children as its institutional arrangements differ from those in place in the US and the UK (see e.g. Kangasniemi 2003 ).
Earlier studies have found a child-penalty of 10 to 15 percent even after several productivity-related characteristics have been controlled for (e.g. Waldfogel 1995 Waldfogel , 1997 Waldfogel , 1998 Budig and England 2001) . My estimates of the size of the motherhood wage penalty correspond roughly with these studies. I find, however, that the penalty varies significantly with the time spent outside the labor market to take care of the child. Mothers who return to the labor market within two years after the birth of the first child suffer considerably smaller wage penalties than mothers who stay longer at home to take care of their child. Furthermore, the penalties seem to decrease fairly quickly with time. For example mothers who experience a break no longer than two years do not differ from non-mothers in terms of wages after three years from the return to the labor market. These findings are in line with the human capital based explanation for the motherhood wage penalty. I also find some evidence that mothers' selection into different types of firms than non-mothers may explain some of the observed wage penalty for children whereas differences in unobserved factors between mothers and childless women do not seem to be important in explaining the motherhood wage penalty.
The paper starts with a discussion about the theoretical background and the previous empirical studies on the motherhood wage penalty. Section 2 also includes a short description of the Finnish family leave system. Section 3 describes the data and presents the methodological approach used in the paper. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 focuses on robustness tests. The last section draws main conclusions.
Background

Theoretical Considerations
The most commonly applied theoretical framework in the literature estimating the wage effects of children on women's wages is based on the human capital theory developed by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) . According to the human capital theory, one reason for the existence of the motherhood wage penalty is differences in the accumulated work experience between mothers and non-mothers. As mothers spend time out of the labor market to rear children they tend to accumulate less work experience, and thus have lower wages, than childless women. It is also possible that the stock of human capital accumulated prior to the career break depreciates during the time out of the labor market. Furthermore, firm specific human capital is lost if mothers return to employment at a different employer.
1 Therefore, it might be that immediately after the return to the labor market mothers do not earn the same wage level as before the career break but have to settle for a lower wage. It is also plausible that anticipation of future career breaks affects pre-labor market human capital investments.
Therefore, we might see other women to invest more heavily in education than mothers-to-be. For the same reason, mothers-to-be may be less motivated to do wage-enhancing investments in job training.
These differences in human capital investments may not only contribute to wage differences before the child-related career break, but may also imply that mothers do not catch-up on other women in wages even in the years following the break.
Another explanation for mothers' lower relative wages can be derived from the theory of compensating wage differentials. According to this theory, in the competitive labor market all jobs are equally attractive to the worker in the equilibrium when both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of jobs are taken into account. If mothers seek jobs that are easier to combine with family requirements and trade off these features for wages, then mothers will earn less than other women.
A less often offered explanation for the motherhood wage penalty is differences in labor market mobility between mothers and non-mothers. Models of job search (e.g. Jovanovic 1979; Burdett 1978 ) emphasize that there is heterogeneity in the quality of employee-employer matches. By searching for better matches workers can experience wage gains through job mobility. It is plausible that because of family requirements mothers are more restricted in their mobility behaviour than are childless women. Therefore, both the probability of job changes and the returns to mobility may be lower for mothers than for other women thus contributing to the motherhood wage penalty.
Theories of discrimination offer yet another explanation for the wage gap between mothers and other women. Economic theories of discrimination can be classified into two broad types of models. The first class of models, initiated by Becker (1971) , formalizes discrimination simply as a "taste" or prejudice by one group against another. The second group of models of discrimination is statistical discrimination. Seminal papers in this area are Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) . These models have their roots in imperfect information about the productivity or/and behaviour of a group of individuals. In a world of imperfect and asymmetric information employers have incentives to use easily 1 It is not a priori clear whether a change of employer results in lower or higher wages. The loss of firm specific human capital affects wages negatively. However, through labor market search a worker might be able to find a job in which his/her productivity is higher than in the previous job leading to higher wages. observable characteristics in forming expectations on the productivity of workers and to discriminate among workers. For example, if mothers are on average less productive than other women (or other workers) then mothers who are motivated and highly productive may suffer from discrimination. This is because they belong to a group whose members are on average fairly loosely attached to the labor market and as a result less productive as well.
Finally, it might be the case that there is no causal relationship whatsoever between children and mothers' wages and that the correlation between wages and children is instead due to unobserved heterogeneity. Individual characteristics like ambition or commitment to the labor market may bias cross-sectional estimates of the motherhood wage penalty if women with less ambition to succeed in the labor market are more likely to have children. These unobserved factors may well explain at least some of the wage gap between mothers and other women.
The theoretical underpinnings of the paper focus on the human capital theory. Motivated by the human capital model, this paper investigates how the motherhood wage penalty varies with the length of the child-related career break. Also, if the depreciation of the stock of human capital during the career break is an important factor behind the wage penalty, then we might see mothers to catch-up with other women in wages after the return to the labor market as mothers update their knowledge and job-related skills. Therefore, I investigate how the child-penalty evolves with time after mother returns to the labor market. Beyond the human capital theory, I explore the importance of firm characteristics in determining the size of the motherhood wage penalty. This is motivated by the theory of compensating wage differentials. And as discussed above, the motherhood wage penalty may reflect differences in unobserved characteristics between mothers and childless women. To investigate this possibility, I also estimate a wage growth model which should remove time-invariant individual heterogeneity.
Previous Empirical Research
It is a well-established empirical fact that women with children have lower wages than childless women.
The size of the motherhood wage penalty varies somewhat between studies, but typically a gross estimate, i.e. without controlling for background characteristics of workers, of the child penalty lies somewhere between 10 to 20 percent (see recent evidence by e.g. Budig and England 2001; Davies and Pierre 2005) . This gap has also been fairly stable, or even widened, over the past few decades (see e.g. Waldfogel 1998; Joshi et al. 1999) . At the same time the wage gap between men and women has narrowed. As a result the motherhood penalty has become an increasingly important component of the gender wage gap in general.
What explains the motherhood wage penalty? One of the most important factors contributing to the penalty is labor market experience. Some researchers have even found that after differences in work experience between mothers and non-mothers have been fully controlled for, the wage penalty practically disappears (e.g. Hill 1979 ). Nevertheless, a much more common finding is that a statistically (and economically) significant motherhood penalty remains also after differences in actual work experience have been accounted for (e.g. Neumark and Korenman 1994; Waldfogel 1995 Waldfogel , 1997 Waldfogel , 1998 Anderson et al. 2003) . Therefore, the fact that mothers accumulate less work experience than childless women is not the whole story behind the motherhood wage penalty. The underlying mechanisms are much more complex and manifold.
Firm-specific human capital has received little attention in empirical research of the motherhood wage penalty. Perhaps one reason for this lack of interest is the fact that in many countries (e.g. in Finland) family leave takers are protected against dismissal during the family leave. Therefore, researchers may have considered the potential loss of firm-specific human capital due to child-related career breaks to be of little importance in this context. Similarly the research examining possible depreciation of the human capital during the maternity leave is scarce. There is some evidence suggesting that skill depreciation may take place during the break, at least in the cases of prolonged employment breaks (e.g. Skyt Nielsen et al. 2004 ).
The theory of compensating wage differentials states that job characteristics and differences in that respect between mothers and other women may contribute to the motherhood wage penalty. The two most heavily studied job characteristics in this literature are part-time jobs and the sector of employment (public vs. private sector). Several studies document that controlling for parttime employment reduces the motherhood penalty, but that even after the part-time status has been accounted for a significant wage penalty remains (Waldfogel 1997; Joshi et al. 1999; Anderson et al. 2003; Davies and Pierre 2005) . There is also evidence on the motherhood wage penalty in both the public and the private sector. However, the penalty is typically somewhat larger in the private sector (e.g. Skyt Nielsen et al. 2004 ). Felfe (2006) uses a data set from Germany which includes information on several pecuniary and non-pecuniary job features. She finds that some part of the motherhood wage penalty in Germany can be interpreted as a compensating wage differential. The contribution of job characteristics to the wage penalty is, however, rather small: the inclusion of the variables for job characteristics in the wage model diminishes the motherhood wage penalty by 10 percent.
There exists a large empirical literature testing the effects of job mobility on wages based on the predictions of job search models (e.g. Bartel and Borjas 1981; Topel and Ward 1992) . Mobility has proved to be an important way to move up in the wage distribution. Although it seems plausible that there are differences in the process of mobility between mothers and other women (primarily because mothers may be more constrained in their mobility due to family commitments), this topic has not yet received any attention in the literature of the motherhood wage penalty. There is some empirical evidence documenting that the wage gains from mobility are lower for women than for men. This difference in returns to mobility is partly explained by gender differences in reasons behind mobility: women change jobs more likely than men because of family or other non-market related reasons whereas men's mobility is typically motivated by money (e.g. Sicherman 1996; McWilliams 1997, 1999; Manning 2003) . Given this evidence it might be a productive direction for future research to analyze differences in mobility behaviour between mothers and childless women as well.
Most papers about discrimination and its role in explaining labor market outcomes between different demographic groups are theoretical in nature. This is understandable because it is, at the very least, challenging to provide direct empirical evidence on discrimination. A common approach is to interpret the residual wage gap (i.e. the wage gap that remains after relevant productivity-related characteristics have been taken into account) as evidence on the labor market discrimination. The obvious problem with this approach is that we cannot ever be totally confident that all the relevant worker characteristics have been controlled for. It is also plausible that we include variables in the wage regressions that are themselves affected by discrimination. In the gender wage gap literature, there are some studies which have focused on examining the variation of the gender wage gap across the wage distribution (e.g. Albrecht et al. 2003) . It has been argued that a priori there should be no reason for the gap to vary across the distribution, and that the finding of increasing gender wage gaps throughout the conditional wage distribution would be evidence of the so-called glass ceiling. Of course, this method lies open to the same kind of criticism as the more conventional average-effect-focused regression methods.
Previous research of the motherhood wage penalty has shown somewhat conflicting results for the importance of unobserved individual heterogeneity. Korenman and Neumark (1992) , using short first-difference models, found evidence of a bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, but in another research in which they used data on sisters, they concluded that the motherhood wage penalty does not reflect unobserved heterogeneity (Neumark and Korenman 1994) . Also for example Waldfogel (1997) found that to the extent that unobserved heterogeneity can be accounted for by applying difference and fixed-effects models the negative effects of having children on women's wages are not due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Family Leave Legislation in Finland
Institutional arrangements, especially family leave legislation, affect mothers' labor market outcomes. Therefore, in analysing the motherhood wage penalty it is important to have basic knowledge of the national legislation governing the duration of the family leaves, the provision of day care etc. Next I outline shortly the general features of the family leave legislation in Finland. Since this paper investigates the effects of child-related career breaks on mothers' wages, the focus is mainly on women thus excluding for example the paternity leave and paternity allowance from the discussion.
The underlying premise of the Finnish family leave system is, on the one hand, to support mothers' labor market participation, but on the other hand, to give mothers (and fathers) the opportunity to stay at home to take care of their children. Maternity leave is 105 weekdays in Finland.
During that period mothers receive maternity allowance, which is based on earnings preceding the leave.
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After the maternity leave, mothers may take parental leave to which fathers are entitled as well. The use of parental leave is flexible: parents can decide to split the parental leave in the way they want to and it is also possible for them to reduce their working hours while taking turns staying at home to take care of the child. The duration of the parental leave is 158 weekdays. Similar to the maternity allowance, also the parental leave allowance is earnings-tested.
Parents are also entitled to care leave until the child is three years old. Care leave is unpaid, but it is possible to receive a child home care allowance for this period. Similar to the parental leave, also the use of care leave is very flexible. Parents are entitled to an unpaid reduction in working hours or to partial care leave until the child finishes its second year at school. Eligibility for the partial care leave requires that a parent has been employed with the same employer for at least the past six months.
An important part of Finnish family policy is legislation on the care of small children which aims to promote mothers' participation in working life. After the parental leave, parents that do not choose to stay at home to look after their child using the care leave opportunity have two options for child care before the child starts school: municipal day-care or private day-care. Regardless of the parents' income level or employment status, every child under school age (typically seven) is entitled to municipal day-care after the parental leave. The fee for the day-care depends on the size and income of the family, but for example the lowest-income families are totally free from these fees. As an alternative to the municipal day-care, a municipality can pay a private child care allowance to provide day-care for a child.
It should be noticed that the Finnish family leave system is fairly generous compared to most other OECD countries. The duration of the maternity leave is rather long and the coverage of publicly provided child care is high in Finland. In fact, Finland along with the other Nordic countries are typically considered as forerunners in promoting family-friendly policies. This statement also gets support from a study investigating family-friendly policies across OECD countries (OECD 2001).
According to this study, the Nordic countries ranked highest on most of the family-friendly indices examined.
Data and Empirical Strategy
Data
The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set from Statistics Finland that links information on The detailed version of the FLEED is maintained at Statistics Finland and because of confidentiality concerns outside researchers get a somewhat limited version of it. Therefore, in my sample the number of variables is somewhat smaller compared to the original FLEED. Also, variables for establishments and firms are modified meaning basically that information on employers is in the form of classified variables (e.g. size group) and growth rates (e.g. rate of employment change) etc.
Information on family leaves comes from the records of The Social Insurance Institution of Finland (KELA). KELA data can be linked to FLEED by using individual identification codes. The KELA data set covers the period 1995-2002, and it contains information on maternity and parental leaves, but not on care leave. This naturally causes problems when trying to identify those mothers who stay longer at home to take care of their children. However, I define the duration of the child-related career break in a way which should differentiate between mothers experiencing a relatively short employment break and mothers staying longer at home (see appendix and the discussion in Section 3.2 below).
In the analysis that follows I focus on individuals who can be linked to firm characteristics using a firm identifier. This practically restricts the sample to the private sector. I also exclude entrepreneurs because their labor market behaviour is probably different from that of paid employees. Furthermore, the earnings of self-employed individuals are difficult to measure properly. In line with most of the earlier studies on the wage effects of children, I restrict the analysis to women. I compare women giving birth to their first child between 1996 and 1997 to women who have no children at their first appearance in the data and who do not give birth during the observation period.
The analysis focuses on potential mothers by restricting the sample to women who were 16-39 years old in 1996/1997.
The data used in the paper can be described as a particularly rich data set. It contains not only several human capital related variables (e.g. the level and type of education, age, job tenure) but also information on many relevant firm characteristics (e.g. industry, firm size, productivity, female share, age structure, average education level, foreign ownership). As is pointed out by for example Felfe (2006) , the importance of job and firm characteristics has not received much attention in the motherhood wage penalty literature, mainly due to lack of appropriate data. Firm characteristics may play a role in explaining the penalty as there is some empirical evidence that mothers tend to select into different jobs and firms than women without children (see Section 2.2 above). The most disturbing shortcoming of my data is the lack of information on working hours and part-time status. Mothers tend to make up for shorter working hours and work on a part-time basis (at least while their children are small) more often than women without children. Therefore, my inability to control for hours spent in work may lead to an overestimation of the motherhood wage penalty. However, in my case, the lack of information on hours and part-time status is probably not such a big problem because I use data from Figure 1 illustrates the empirical strategy used in the paper. As discussed above, I focus on women giving birth to their first child between 1996 and 1997 (mothers) and on women without children (nonmothers). To get information on the effects of a child-related career break on women's wages I compare the wage outcomes of mothers and non-mothers both before and after the career break.
Empirical Strategy
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I analyse wages not only one year before the birth (t-1) but also two and three years before the break (t-2, t-3). This is because mothers-to-be's behaviour may be affected by the future career break. Kunze and Ejrnaes (2004) for example found a wage dip for mothers-to-be before the child-related career break.
This finding is analogous to the famous Ashenfelter's dip (following Ashenfelter 1978) familiar in the labor market evaluation literature. The employment break lasts from year t0 to year t+1. In year t0 the mother gives birth to her first child. Year t+1 is the first year after the child-birth when the mother has a valid wage observation (see appendix about the definition of the valid wage observation) and no family leave days during the year. Years t+2 and t+3 are the corresponding observation points for wage comparisons two and three years after the end of the employment break, respectively. By investigating wages at several points in time we get information on how the possible motherhood wage penalty evolves over time.
Of course, my measure of the length of the child-related career break defined as the difference between t+1 and t0 is a fairly rough measure of the actual duration of the career break.
However, as my intention is not to try to estimate the effect of one family leave day on mothers' wages but rather to provide information on how the wage effects may differ between mothers who experience a relatively short career break (about 1-2 years) and mothers who stay considerably longer (three years or more) at home taking care of their child, my definition of the length of the break is well justified.
Nevertheless, it is true that my conclusions may be affected by how the observation points for wage comparisons are defined. Therefore, in Section 5.2 I experiment with some alternative ways of defining the observation points and investigate how sensitive my results are in this respect.
It should be pointed out that some mothers experience more than one child-related career break during the investigation period. However, the focus of this study is on the effects on mothers' wages of the first observed child-related career break starting in year t0. Therefore for each mother I use at most one t+1, t+2 and t+3 wage observation. This simplifies the analysis somewhat.
Nevertheless, future career breaks may well affect the wage penalties related to the first break. To
Of course, non-mothers do not experience a child-related career break. They are women without children who must be found in employment at least once both before and after 1997 to be included in the analysis. It is not, however, required that they must be employed in every year during the investigation period but other kind of career breaks not related to childbirth are allowed. control for this, the wage model includes a variable taking a value of one if a mother, who has returned to the labor market after the first child-related career break, appears on the maternity leave again later on during the observation period.
As a final note to the empirical strategy presented above it must be stressed that the mothers considered in this paper may be a somewhat selected group. The empirical evidence shows that mothers' labor market participation rate is typically lower than that of childless women (e.g.
OECD 2002
). I, however, focus on mothers who are observed in the private sector at least once during the two years preceding the birth of their first child and who return to the private sector after the childrelated career break before the end of my observation period. Similar conditions apply to the comparison group as well, i.e. the comparison group consists of childless women who are employed in the private sector before and after year t0.
To investigate the magnitude of the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish private sector I estimate the following wage regression:
where i refers to individuals and t refers to year, lnW is the log of real monthly wages 7 , X is a vector of worker characteristics, Z is a vector containing firm characteristics, Y is an array of year dummies, and ε is a disturbance term. As discussed above, the wage model is estimated for three years preceding year t0
and for three years following the return of the mother to the labor market after year t0. The vector of worker characteristics includes age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, dummies for the level of education (4 categories), dummies for the field of education (3 categories), a dummy indicating whether a woman is currently married. In addition, X includes career break variables. To allow the wage penalty effects to vary with the length of the child-related break, I include five indicators in the model: (i) no break, i.e. women without children (omitted group), (ii) one-year break (i.e. t+1 -t0 = 1), (iii) two-year break, (iv) three-year break, and (v) a break of more than three years.
It is plausible that mothers who differ with respect to the length of the child-related career break also differ in terms of some key background characteristics. For example, mothers who stay longer at home taking care of their child may be less career-oriented than mothers who experience a shorter career break. Therefore, we might see wages to vary already before the break depending on the length of the future career break. To capture this potential heterogeneity in wages, I estimate the wage model for the period preceding the birth using the same set of career break variables as for the period following the return to the labor market. That is, I distinguish between future mothers who are going to experience a one-year break, a two-year break, etc.
Finally, as discussed above, mothers may experience several child-related career breaks during the investigation period. These additional career breaks may affect mothers' wage development following upon the first break. I control for this by including a variable in vector X which takes a value of one if a mother who has returned to the labor market from her first child-related career break appears on the maternity leave again later on during the investigation period.
Vector Z in equation (1) includes the following firm characteristics: size (4 categories), a dummy for foreign ownership, the personnel's average years of schooling and its square, the average age of the personnel and its square, average tenure and its square, the female share of the personnel, the log of a productivity measure, and industry dummies (24 categories).
To get some idea of the factors affecting the potential motherhood wage penalty in the comes to policy recommendations. For example, if it is found that the motherhood wage penalty is mostly due to long career breaks, then one policy option to improve mothers' labor market standing would be to increase subsidized day care. This would help mothers to make a quicker return to the labor market after child-birth. The empirical strategy applied in this paper sheds light on these important aspects. Table 1A in the appendix presents summary statistics for periods t-1, t+1, t+2 and t+3. To keep the table manageable, periods t-3 and t-2 are not included. The results for the two excluded periods are, however, similar to those of period t-1. Also, I do not present statistics for all the variables used in the estimations, but only for those that I consider to be of most interest. Results for the excluded periods and variables are, of course, available from the author upon request.
Some Descriptive Results
As can be seen, before the childbirth, the average log real monthly wage of the mothersto-be is somewhat higher than that of the non-mothers. However, after the career break, mothers lag behind non-mothers in wages. In period t+1, the wage gap between non-mothers and mothers is 13.8 log points. The gap exists also in periods t+2 and t+3, but the mothers seem to catch-up on other women: three years after the break the wage gap between childless women and mothers is 5.1 log points.
Table 1A also documents that there are differences in the background characteristics between mothers and childless women. Mothers are for example slightly more educated than women without children. There are differences in the fields of education as well: in my sample, mothers choose more often than non-mothers social sciences and business or technology. The mothers are also slightly younger, have less job tenure, and are more likely to be married than women without children. There seems to be some differences in terms of firm characteristics as well. For example, compared to mothers, non-mothers work more often in firms with lower female share of the personnel and in firms with more educated employees. These differences are statistically significant as well.
These summary statistics thus seem to imply that in line with the evidence from other countries, also in Finland there exists a motherhood wage penalty. However, as is evident from Table   1A , there are differences in the characteristics (besides family status) between mothers and childless women which may contribute to the wage penalty. Therefore, getting more credible evidence on the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish private sector requires the use of a multivariable regression model. Results from this exercise are presented in the next section.
Results
Estimates of the Motherhood Wage Penalty
The estimates of the motherhood wage penalty are given in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the results for a model which includes only the human capital related variables whereas Table 2 adds firm characteristics to the model. Estimations are run for four periods: t-1, t+1, t+2 and t+3. Because of the potential "Ashenfelter's dip effect", I estimated the models for periods t-2 and t-3 as well. The results for these years do not, however, differ much from those of period t-1 and therefore, I do not report them here. They are available from the author upon request.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that motherhood affects women's wages in the Finnish private sector. Starting with Table 1 , the future mothers and other women do not differ that much in wages before the child-related career break after differences in human capital endowments have been controlled for. The future mothers' wages seem to be somewhat higher compared to childless women but the difference is statistically significance only in a case of a break of two years.
However, after the child-related career break a considerable wage gap has emerged between childless women and mothers. Mothers who stay out of the labor market no longer than for two years lag behind non-mothers in wages 8-12 percent in the year following the return to employment. Mothers spending longer periods at home suffer a wage penalty as high as 21.2 percent in period t+1.
Even though the penalties immediately after the return to the labor market are fairly large, mothers seem to catch-up on other women in wages during the first three years following the return. For example, mothers who experience a break no longer than two years do not differ from other women in terms of wages after three years from the return to the labor market. Also mothers who decide to stay longer at home taking care of their child appear to catch up with the wages of the childless women. However, the longer the child-related career break is, the longer it seems to take for a mother to catch-up on the childless women in wages: mothers who experience a break of longer than two years suffer a wage penalty of 10.6-13.3 percent still after three years from their return to the labor market. My results of the catching-up effect are very similar to those found by Datta Gupta and Smith (2002) who used data from the Danish labor market. Their results also suggest that children do have negative effects on mothers' wages, but that the effects are only temporary in nature. 1. In addition to the variables presented above, the regressions also include year dummies and in the case of periods following the career break, a variable indicating whether a mother is observed on maternity leave later on during the investigation period. Table 2 documents the results for the wage model containing both the human capital variables and firm characteristics. As can be seen, firm characteristics increase significantly the model's ability to explain the observed variation in wages (R 2 increases by about ten percentage points). By comparing Tables 1 and 2 we notice that they have effects on the size of the motherhood wage penalty as well. For example among mothers who experience a one-year break, including firm characteristics in the model decreases the relative child-penalty 9 between periods t-1 and t+1 by 7.5 percent. On the other hand, the average decrease in the relative child-penalty across the time periods (t-1 and t+1, t-1 and t+2, t-1 and t+3) is 6.8 percent for this group of mothers. For mothers experiencing a two-year break, a three-year break or a break longer than three years the corresponding figure is 9.2, 8.8 and 7.2 percent respectively. These figures correspond roughly with those found by Felfe (2006) who used data from Germany. She concluded that controlling for job characteristics diminishes the child penalty by about 10 percent.
It should be noticed that although my data contain a fairly rich set of firm characteristics, there are several important firm and job features on which I have no data. In particular, it is unfortunate that my data do not include any information on the degree of flexibility with respect to work-time scheduling or part-time work because these are the kinds of job characteristics that mothers may consider particularly advantageous in order to better combine family and career. Therefore, it is likely that I would find firm characteristics to be more important with respect to the motherhood wage penalty than what my results suggest if I were able to control for firm characteristics in more detailed fashion. 1. In addition to the variables presented above, the regressions also include year dummies, industry indicators (24 categories) and in the case of periods following the career break, a variable indicating whether a mother is observed on maternity leave later on during the investigation period.
To give a summary of the results documented in Tables 1 and 2 , I find evidence of the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish private sector. The penalty cannot be explained by differences in pre-market human capital investments between mothers and non-mothers as the penalty is observed even after the level and the field of education have been controlled for. I find some evidence that mothers may select into different types of firms than non-mothers, and taking this into account in the wage regressions by including several firm characteristics in the wage model decreases the estimated size of the motherhood wage penalty by about 8 percent leaving it, however, still statistically significant. Interestingly, the size of the penalty resulting from the first child-related career break varies strongly with the length of the break. Mothers who return to the labor market relatively quickly suffer considerably smaller wage penalty than mothers who stay longer at home to take care of their child.
This suggests that depreciation of the stock of human capital during the career break might contribute to the penalty as the depreciation is likely to be stronger among mothers who experience a longer break. Furthermore, the penalties seem to decrease fairly quickly with time. For example mothers who experience a break no longer than two years do not differ from non-mothers in terms of wages after three years from the return to the labor market. This finding not only supports the human capital based explanation for the motherhood wage penalty, but it also suggests that the long-term effects of children on mothers' wages are likely to be fairly small in the Finnish private sector.
Variation of the Motherhood Penalty across the Wage Distribution
The results in Tables 1 and 2 are estimates of the motherhood wage penalty at the mean of the observed distribution of wages. There might, however, be considerable variation in the wage penalty across the wage distribution. This could for example be due to discriminatory factors. If mothers face barriers to high-paying and demanding jobs, we may find larger motherhood wage penalties at the top of the wage distribution.
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To get information on the effects of children at different points of the wage distribution, I utilize the quantile regression framework (see e.g. Koenker and Bassett 1978) . The quantile regression technique is applied to the full wage model specification by use of the bootstrap option (to obtain robust standard errors). However, due to the large number of observations estimation by bootstrapping becomes fairly burdensome and time-consuming. Therefore, I have drawn a 20 percent random sample from the women without children. They were sampled from 1996 cohort and then followed both before and after 1996.
There has recently been increasing interest in using the quantile regression techniques in the gender wage gap literature. Researchers have been occupied by the question of how gender affects both the location and the shape of the wage distribution. The quantile regression method provides tools to address this question. Several studies have documented that the gender wage gap typically varies across the wage distribution and therefore the mean gender wage gap might hide important information. For example, there is evidence from different countries that the gender wage gap increases throughout the conditional wage distribution with an acceleration in the upper tail of the wage distribution (e.g. Albrecht et al. 2003; Arulampalam et al. 2007 ). This has been interpreted as evidence of the existence of a glass ceiling preventing women from entering the most high-paying and demanding jobs. My paper makes an interesting contribution by applying the quantile regression technique in the analysis of the motherhood wage penalty. To author's best knowledge, there are no earlier studies in this field of research that have utilized quantile regression method. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients on the break variables together with t-values at different percentiles of the conditional wage distribution. The conclusion made earlier about the relatively low penalties for mothers who experience a short career break seems to hold throughout the conditional wage distribution. Nevertheless, there is also some interesting variation in the penalties across the distribution. Most notably, the large average wage penalties for mothers who spend longer periods at home taking care of their child appear to be driven by heavy penalties at the upper tail of the 1. The estimated model is the full model containing both the human capital variables and the firm characteristics. In all percentiles, the omitted group is women without children. 2. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. 3. * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level.
conditional wage distribution. Instead for mothers who experience a break of no longer than two years, the relative wage penalty for children is fairly constant across the wage distribution. Therefore, the glass ceiling type of explanation for the motherhood wage penalty does not receive clear-cut support in my data. However, it should be noticed that the standard errors for the estimated penalties are high. To get more reliable answers to how the motherhood wage penalty varies throughout the wage distribution would require larger sample size.
Robustness Tests
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Thus far I have only taken observable characteristics into account in the analysis. It may well be that differences in some unobservable factors (e.g. in motivation) between mothers and childless women bias my estimates of the motherhood wage penalty. To give an example, if women with lower motivation to succeed in the labor market are more likely to have children, then this kind of unobserved heterogeneity may explain at least some of the negative correlation between children and mothers' wages. On the other hand, it is equally plausible that mothers who are observed in the labor market are those with high earnings potential. In this case, unobserved heterogeneity would lead to downward biased estimates of the child penalties.
To test the heterogeneity explanation for the motherhood wage penalty I apply a difference wage specification in which all variables are expressed as differences. Assuming that the unobserved factors do not vary over time, this method removes unobserved heterogeneity. I compare childless women to two groups of mothers: those who have experienced a two-year break and those who have spent four years at home taking care of their child. The estimated model is of the following form:
where ∆lnW = (lnW it+j -lnW it-1 ) and j = {1, 2, 3}. ∆X and ∆Z on the other hand refer to changes in worker and firm characteristics respectively.
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The error term constitutes of the individual fixed effect (α i ) and of the disturbance term (µ it ) which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with zero mean and variance δ 2 . Since the individual fixed effect is by assumption constant over time it drops out from the model.
The results for the difference model are shown in Tables 4 and 5 . The same general conclusions that were drawn from Tables 1 and 2 can be made also now. First of all, mothers face a considerable wage penalty immediately after their return to the labor market, but they seem to catch-up on childless women in wages. Secondly, mothers who spend a shorter period at home taking care of their child suffer much smaller wage losses compared to mothers who experience longer child-related career breaks. However, perhaps the most interesting observation from Tables 4 and 5 is that the results documented in these tables are remarkably similar to those presented in Table 2 . This suggests that the previous conclusions about the existence and the size of the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish private sector are not seriously biased by unobserved individual heterogeneity. 1. ∆ refers to the difference between two time periods. For example, in the case of time period t+1, ∆ tenure = tenure(t+1) -tenure(t-1), ∆tenure 2 /10 = tenure(t+1) 2 /10 -tenure(t-1) 2 /10, and so on. 2. In addition to the variables presented above, the regressions also include year dummies and a variable indicating whether a mother is observed on maternity leave later on during the investigation period. 2. In addition to the variables presented above, the regressions also include year dummies and a variable indicating whether a mother is observed on maternity leave later on during the investigation period.
Sample Restrictions
Earlier in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 I discussed the restrictions applied to the data. One may be concerned that they might have affected my conclusions concerning the motherhood wage penalty. This section examines in a more detailed fashion the sensitivity of my results to the data restrictions made.
I start with the age restriction. I have focused on women who were 16-39 year-old in 1996-1997. To gather confidence that my results are not driven by this restriction, I run the estimations also by using another sample of women consisting of potential mothers of age 20-35 in 1996-1997 . The estimation results for this group are, however, very similar to those presented in Tables 1 and 2 . The results using this different age restriction are not documented in the paper but they are available from the author upon request.
I also experimented with alternative ways of defining the after-the-break periods. As discussed above, year t+1 is the first year after the child-related career break when the mother has a valid wage observation and zero parental leave days. The length of the break is then based on the difference between year t+1 and the year the mother gives birth to her first child. This is of course quite a rough measure of the length of the break. There might for example be mothers who have been only one or a few days on parental leave in year x and in employment for the rest of that year. In this situation it would then be more appropriate to define year x as her first year in employment after the break rather than year x+1 (as when using my preferred definition for year t+1). To ensure that my conclusions about the relationship between the size of the motherhood wage penalty and the length of the break are not seriously biased by the way the observation points for wage comparisons are defined, I experimented with some alternative definitions. For example, instead of requiring zero parental leave days in year t+1, I allowed 63 parental leave days (about three work months) during that year. Table 2A in the appendix documents the results for this case. As can be seen, the estimates of the motherhood wage penalty in Table 2A correspond roughly to those presented in Table 2 . Typically the estimated motherhood wage penalties in Table 2A are somewhat larger (about 1-4 percentage points) compared to those presented in Table 2 , but the general conclusions that can be drawn from the two tables are nevertheless similar: the penalties decrease significantly with time and mothers who experience a relatively short break suffer smaller penalties than mothers spending more time at home. I also made estimations using a few other definitions of the after-the-break periods and they all produced results similar to those presented in Table 2 .
Finally, I examined the sensitivity of my results to the restrictions imposed on the monthly wage. As mentioned in Section 3.2, in order to exclude outliers, I imposed a lower bound of 600 euros and an upper bound of 20 000 euros. To check that my conclusions are not driven by this restriction I estimated the full wage model without applying any restrictions on monthly wages. The results for the unrestricted model were very similar to those for the restricted model.
Other Robustness Tests
My estimations of the motherhood wage penalty imply that the penalty decreases fairly quickly with time spent in the labor market after the break. However, this conclusion is based on estimations where the underlying population is not exactly the same for all observation periods. Therefore, table 3A in the appendix shows the results for the full wage model in the case where I restrict myself to those individuals from whom I have wage observations for all the periods: t-1, t+1, t+2 and t+3. As can be seen from the table, also for this sample I observe mothers to catch-up on other women in wages after their return to the labor market.
In Section 5.1 I discussed the problems arising from unobserved heterogeneity. There are, however, many other potential sources of bias. One is the potential sample selection bias resulting indicating whether or not a woman is in employment in year t. Selection into employment was modelled using age, age squared, educational dummies, and dummies for marriage and children as explanatory variables.
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The results (not shown here) suggest that selection into employment is not likely to be a serious problem in my case. The coefficients for the break variables are typically similar in the Heckman selection model and the OLS model. Furthermore, the selection term differs significantly from zero only in some cases and when this happens, the inclusion of the selection term causes only small changes in the career break coefficients. Also several other studies using fairly new data have not found evidence of a significant selection bias (e.g. Waldfogel 1995; Joshi et al. 1999 ).
My results may also be biased because of endogeneity problems. Instead of children leading to lower wages, it is possible that low wages increase the probability to have children. If this is the case then ignoring the endogeneity of children and child-related career breaks would result in an overestimation of the motherhood wage penalty. The endogeneity of children could be tested by applying an instrumental variables method. Unfortunately, my data do not contain any variables which could be considered as valid instruments. However, several earlier studies have found that the exogeneity of children cannot typically be rejected (e.g. Korenman and Neumark 1994; Waldfogel 1995; Skyt Nielsen et al. 2004 ). 
Conclusions
This paper is about the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish private sector. The motherhood wage effects are investigated by comparing the wages of women who give birth to their first child between 1996 and 1997 to the wages of childless women. Wage comparisons are made both before and after child-birth in order to obtain information on the changes in relative wage positions.
I find evidence on the existence of motherhood wage penalties in the Finnish labor market. The size of the average penalty roughly corresponds to that found in studies for other countries. The estimation results indicate that the motherhood wage penalty varies significantly with the length of the child-related career break. Mothers who experience a relatively short career break face considerably smaller wage penalties than mothers who spend longer periods at home taking care of their child. The penalties also seem to decrease fairly quickly with time after the mother's return to the labor market. For example mothers who experience a break no longer than two years do not differ from non-mothers in terms of wages after three years from the return to the labor market. These findings not only support the human capital based explanation for the motherhood wage penalty, but they also suggests that the long-term effects of children on mothers' wages are likely to be fairly small in the Finnish private sector.
13 Of course, the reliability of this conclusion depends in the end on the validity of the instruments used. Examples of variables used as an instrument for children are parents' education, the number of siblings and the partner's income. It is relatively easy to come up with reasons why these variables might be correlated not only with a child variable but also with the mother's wage. Therefore, the results concerning the exogeneity of children found in the literature can be called into question.
Beyond the human capital theory, I also investigated the importance of firm characteristics in explaining the motherhood wage penalty. I find some evidence that mothers may select into different types of firms than non-mothers, and taking this into account in the wage regressions by including several firm characteristics in the wage model decreases the estimated size of the motherhood wage penalty by about 8 percent leaving it, however, still statistically significant. Also the role of unobserved individual heterogeneity was investigated by estimating a wage growth model. The wage growth model produces similar results than the wage level model implying that the possible differences in unobserved factors between mothers and childless women are not the driving force behind the motherhood wage penalty in the Finnish private sector. 1. In addition to the variables presented above, the regressions also include year dummies, industry indicators (24 categories) and in the case of periods following the career break, a variable indicating whether a mother is observed on maternity leave later on during the investigation period. 2. In table 2A, after-the-break periods are defined otherwise similar to that explained in Section 3.2, but here I allow 63 parental leave days during year t+1 instead of requiring zero leave days in that year. 
